

Intelligence and Intelligence Studies: An Austrian Perspective

By Siegfried Beer

September 11, 2001 and the subsequent »war on terrorism« have significantly transformed the role and standing of intelligence in world affairs. The threat of »superterrorism« by terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda has supplanted the Cold War motto of »learning to live with the bomb« with today's challenge of »having to learn to live with intelligence.«¹ Yet to this day intelligence, as »*the hidden hand*«,² remains among the »*least understood*« and »*most under-theorized*« aspects of international relations.³ It is also widely misread and misjudged. Perhaps one way of explaining it is to reduce it to its three basic elements, as defined in Sherman Kent's classic study of America's intelligence needs after World War II: »*intelligence is knowledge; intelligence is organization and intelligence is activity.*«⁴

At the beginning of the 20th century intelligence institutions of major powers, still almost exclusively military, were in a comparatively primitive state; they were understaffed, underfinanced and generally held in low esteem. Today intelligence has become an integral part of national internal security and international behaviour of even small nations. The globalization of communication as well as the creation and importance of international organizations over the last century have stimulated the growth and raised the importance of national as well as private intelligence agencies.⁵

This survey essay is an attempt to position intelligence and the study thereof in the world of international politics as product and activity, created and undertaken by mostly national agencies, usually kept and financed by states, to assure better security at home and to maximize national interests abroad. It wants to serve as an introduction to a complex yet increasingly more relevant topic from a Central European viewpoint, intentionally addressing itself to a non-specialist audience.⁶

»Intelligence Revolutions«

Public knowledge about intelligence has greatly increased over the last quarter century

as academic scholars, practitioners of the trade, and serious journalists have taken up the study of this »*missing dimension*« in diplomatic history,⁷ but no less in military and political history. Richard W. Rowan's accusation, that spies have had a greater influence on the course of history than on the work of historians, which was included in the introduction to his survey of espionage in world history, held true in 1938 and was still valid when this bestseller was reprinted in 1969.⁸ Since the mid-1970s, however, scholarly attention has been applied to the subject of intelligence and a distinct discipline has emerged, which is generally known as »intelligence studies«. It can certainly be claimed that over the last three decades intelligence and intelligence studies have become a considerable growth industry with monographs, periodicals, anthologies and symposia proliferating, thereby seemingly marking the acceptance of intelligence as a serious and respectable academic discipline. Over the last decades historians have shown and documented that the 20th century has seen an intelligence revolution, which has impacted on world history in a massive way, and not just in warfare.⁹ It was mainly with the publication of J. C. Masterman's *The Double Cross System* and the subsequent leakage of the »Ultra Secret«, that is, the revelation of the painstakingly guarded successes of the Western Allies against the German and also against the Japanese (»Magic«) war machines during the Second World War, that a wider and also an academic interest in intelligence issues was stirred.¹⁰

Intelligence can be said to have two principal roots: one is diplomatic, seeking information about other states, actually or potentially inimical to that state; the other is military-operational, securing knowledge of the capabilities, intentions and movements of other armed forces. Thus, a necessary precondition of intelligence is the systematic observation of foreign powers, their armies, and their ruling elites over longer peri-

ods of time.¹¹ Though spying is as old as organized mankind (even if perhaps only »the second-oldest profession«), it was only slightly over a century ago that governments started to create separate and soon thereafter permanent institutions to pursue a strategy of systematic gathering of information about other countries.¹² As imperial tensions of the late 19th century and fast-paced technological changes, particularly in the field of armaments, combined, a public fascination but also a fear about subversive activities and espionage began to be generated; this in turn led to a widely perceived need for protection (counter espionage) and offence (foreign intelligence) particularly in the period before World War I.¹³ At about the same time the genre of spy fiction was launched on its successful path into the 20th century.¹⁴ Naturally World War I greatly increased the scope for espionage by technological means, particularly in the area of interception of radio signals and application of aerial photography. The 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, and soon thereafter, the victory of the Communists over counter-revolutionary forces in Russia stressed the need for continued peace-time intelligence operations, now also linked to ideological motives.

While intelligence efforts and investments diminished somewhat in the 1920s, by the mid-thirties at the latest a significant build-up of intelligence institutions by aggressive as well as defence-oriented countries can be ascertained. Then World War II became a veritable intelligence war, most innovatively and perhaps even decisively in the field of signals intelligence, i. e. the breaking of enemy ciphers. The early Cold War quickly re-focussed states and governments to an unprecedented scale of secret intelligence collection and analysis; by the 1960s the intelligence war between Moscow and Washington was driven by mutual satellite surveillance. Both sides now sought »total« intelligence about the respective main enemy and its satellite states. Intelligence became an in-

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One of three parts of a German radio message deciphered by British cryptanalysts in Bletchley Park. From January 1940 on, British experts of the »Ultra«-program were able to decipher messages of the German Army, and from May 1941 on, of the German Navy. Photo: USAF.

within political, social, military and international history. The leading political scientists within intelligence studies are mostly American. Their work is mainly analytical-descriptive and deals primarily with the post-1945 development of intelligence.¹⁷ Notable practitioner-scholars are also mainly American-British and almost exclusively concerned with the Cold War era. So are the leading intelligence journalists and freelance writers. Some of the work of both of these groups is impressive and even essential, particularly for historical research.¹⁸

One of the main indicators for the liveliness of intelligence studies has been the growth of intelligence literature in scholarly journals and the founding of periodicals exclusively or largely devoted to intelligence matters. The two leading international intelligence journals dealing with historical issues were both founded in the mid-1980s: *Intelligence and National Security* (INS), published by Frank Cass in London, and the *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* (IJIC), now published by Taylor & Francis in Philadelphia, PA. During the last decade two more periodicals have entered the field: *The Journal of Intelligence History* (JIH), published by LIT-Verlag in Münster under the editorship of the International Intelligence History Association (IIHA) and since 2007 the *Journal for Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies* (JIPSS), published by the Austrian Center for Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies (ACIPSS) in Graz. An annotated guide of past and present intelligence periodicals, dealing with questions of intelligence of any kind, appeared in 1992 and listed altogether 155 entries.¹⁹ It has practically become impossible for one and the same scholar to cover and master the entire gamut of the intelligence sciences.

At the same time the teaching of intelligence has become more wide-spread, at least in the English-speaking world. The National Intelligence Study Center (NISC) in

creasingly technology-driven industry. But high-tech created a hitherto unknown problem: information overload through practically limitless reliance on signals and imagery intelligence drawn from satellites, spy planes and drone systems. As a consequence, the cost of high-tech intelligence has created a huge technology gap and has since the 1990s secured the United States its sole position of intelligence »hyper« power. Human intelligence (HUMINT) seemed on its way out, but only until September 11, 2001. Intelligence as evolved since 1945 has clearly become a multinational activity and with its growing international anti-terrorism networks, as Michael Herman has argued, is quickly becoming an international system in its own right.¹⁵

Even though intelligence historians and other intelligence scientists have started to

illuminate and explicate the role and history of espionage and of intelligence institutions, it must be admitted, that to this day their academic discipline, the field of intelligence studies, still occupies only a small part of the international relations agenda. The growing intelligence studies community is by and large comprised of four groups: historians, political scientists, practitioner-scholars and freelance writers/journalists. Among these the historians have been pre-eminent, and scholars from the English-speaking world have definitely been leading the way.¹⁶

The historians' pre-eminence within the intelligence studies community is based on their conceptual as well as their empirical work, as they have been able to give direction in terms of typology, methodology and even theory of intelligence, as well as providing the context for intelligence studies

Washington, DC has conducted three surveys of college and university courses on the subject of intelligence and published their results in 1980, 1985 and 1992.²⁰ A further survey, this time conducted world-wide, was published in 2000.²¹ An increasing number of American universities now offer undergraduate and graduate programs in military or competitive intelligence (i. e. industrial espionage) and recently British universities have followed their example.²² Finally, professional associations devoted to the study and discussion of intelligence have been established, first in Great Britain, Canada and the United States, and belatedly also in continental Europe. Among the main and oldest associations three deserve to be singled out: the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies, the British Study Group on Intelligence, and the Intelligence Section of the International Studies Association in the United States. European associations exist in several Scandinavian countries, in Holland (The Netherlands Intelligence Studies Association) and in Germany (Arbeitskreis Geschichte der Nachrichtendienste).²³ They all profit from a dialogue with veterans of national intelligence, who typically have organized themselves in a variety of professional organizations consisting mainly of retired personnel. In Europe these retired professionals are usually integrated into their respective national associations of intelligence studies.

To sum up, a widely effective intelligence revolution has been manifesting itself throughout the course of the 20th century and into the 21st century. This particular revolution has finally found an echo in a scholarly revolution which has started slowly and only after about 1975, but it has accelerated since the 1980s and has produced impressive results particularly in the 1990s and beyond.²⁴

The Search for a Definition, Doctrine or Theory of Intelligence

Is there a correct definition of intelligence?²⁵ Thomas Troy offers one and opts for brevity: *»intelligence is knowledge of the enemy«*, further qualifying the enemy as actual or potential.²⁶ There are numerous attempts to characterize intelligence.²⁷ A former CIA chief, for example, offers a definition of intelligence as *»information about the plans, the intentions, and the capabilities of other nations«*,²⁸ whereas a former CIA officer-turned-scholar proposes a more complete, yet still brief notion of intelligence as product and process: *»Intelligence is 1) information about an adversary useful in dealing with him; 2) an organiza-*

*tion or activity concerned with such information.«*²⁹ What is missing in many definitions is a reference to hostility, warfare and spying, which the theorists of military intelligence have long since seen as their main concern, namely *»the discovery of military secrets.«*³⁰ Clearly, secrecy is necessary if the sources or the policy issues are sensitive. What about the recipient of intelligence? My own definition of intelligence therefore claims that intelligence is information – often secret – collected, organized and/or analyzed on behalf of decision-makers (be they military, political or economic/private).³¹

The search for the correct definition of intelligence can only serve as the starting point for a doctrine or even a theory of intelligence that can claim to encompass the whole gamut of what modern intelligence institutions are expected to do and represent. It was in the late 1950s that the belief gained ground that intelligence had to be put on a sounder theoretical basis. However, intelligence practitioners remained sceptical and even argued that a theory of intelligence would create unnecessary complications.³² Like the majority of the leading intelligencers, most international relations scholars then (as they still tend to do now) looked upon intelligence as a mere craft rather than as a science per se.³³ This may in part explain why there have been so few attempts to propose holistic concepts of intelligence, which could be tested as a theory or doctrine of intelligence.³⁴

To date only one ambitious intelligence expert has convincingly offered a really comprehensive explanation about the historical evolution of espionage and intelligence. In *Toward a Theory of Intelligence*, published in 1995, David Kahn, otherwise best known for his expertise on signals intelligence, clearly emphasizes military intelligence and strives to seek three clarifications:³⁵ to explain the rise of military intelligence to its present level of importance; to show how intelligence works, and to address its main unsolved problems of today and for tomorrow. Kahn explains that from ancient times there have mainly been sporadic episodes of espionage but no regularly organized efforts to gain intelligence. Only as larger armies and industrialization resulted in new conditions for warfare, was a need for information about such factors as coal and iron production, transportation of armies, or mobilization of troops created. The political and industrial revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries provided the tools to explore these newly established targets. It was through *»physical intelligence«*, that is reconnaissance

and systematic observation, that vital information was drawn, at first from balloons and zeppelins and soon from airplanes, and with special cameras. Information was extracted not from words but from things. Another source of information also emerged through technical innovations and communication development: *»verbal intelligence«*, acquired from a verbal or written source. Parliamentary debates, the daily press, public reports, or even the tapping of telegraph wires yielded information, at first gathered by military attachés. This verbal intelligence provided information significantly in advance of physical intelligence.

While physical intelligence can inform about enemy capabilities, verbal intelligence tells of enemy intentions as well. Before World War I, physical intelligence supplied almost all information sought, but this kind of evidence rarely provided commanders enough time to win battles. Then, during the Great War, two inventions, the radio telephone and the trench telephone offered commanders information in time to help win battles. This heightened the role of intelligence and in the inter-war years most great powers reacted to this break-through by establishing code-breaking agencies, which were to rise to great prominence in World War II. The intelligence feats of the Allies in developing *»Ultra«* and *»Magic«* elevated intelligence to a highly sensitive political and military instrument capable of making the potential difference between victory and defeat in battle and diplomacy. Thus, the theory of physical and verbal intelligence convincingly helps to explain the evolution of intelligence from its episodic beginnings to the intelligence revolution of the 20th century.

But are there permanent elements or timeless principles of intelligence that reach into the present or even into the future? David Kahn has very recently extended his theoretical scope and offers several conceptual generalizations, almost principles, to which I have added essential elements introduced by other theorists.³⁶ Thus ten major premises for a general theory of intelligence emerge:

- Intelligence optimizes one's resources by improving command and security.
- Intelligence can serve only as an auxiliary element; even in war it remains of secondary importance in view of the necessity for armaments, supply, troop quality or even inspirational skills by commanders.
- Intelligence is perhaps more essential to the defence than to the offence. This was borne out by history again and again, on the one hand, by the relative frequency



The building of the Austro-Hungarian War Ministry in Vienna was the location of the Evidenzbureau where Alfred Redl pursued the major part of his career and where he acted as a spy for the Russian service. Photo: Gryffindor.

of defensive intelligence successes over offensive postures and on the other, by the phenomenon that aggressors frequently neglect(ed) or underestimate(d) intelligence, while defensive nations tend(ed) towards relying on it.

- Intelligence enjoys a secure future, for intelligence is an instrument of conflict and crisis, and human history has never known extended periods without conflicts and crises between individuals, states or peoples.
- Intelligence *per se* is subjective; it assumes importance only in relation to a conflict, real or imagined.
- Intelligence is always about someone else; that someone else is almost always a rival or enemy, potential or actual. One does not collect intelligence in comparable intensity on friends, unless one is already suspicious of them.
- Intelligence faces two basic and ultimately unsolvable problems: the need to assess and predict accurately and
- the difficulty of convincing decision-makers, be they statesmen, generals or managers, to accept information they may not like to be confronted with.
- Superior or even adequate intelligence lessens tensions and the risk of war or catastrophe. In war, good intelligence shortens the struggle and in peace it reduces uncertainty and stabilizes the international and/or security system.³⁷
- Good intelligence can also save money by reducing the need to acquire ever more military and/or technically sophisticated equipment.

– The heart of intelligence is the support of appropriate action over time.³⁸

Does all this amount to a solid theory of intelligence in international and national security politics alike? Hardly, but it does constitute considerable progress in view of the wide-spread neglect of theoretical thinking on intelligence so far. What then are the chances of integrating intelligence studies more vigorously into security studies and international relations, looking for a common theoretical ground on which the theory of power, so prevalent in the study and field of international relations, may be augmented by a theory of knowledge so central to intelligence activity? Nothing points to the notion that the international relations community, essentially dominated by American political scientists, finds it desirable or necessary to craft a theory of intelligence within the realm of international relations.³⁹

Austria: A Central European Case Study

It is commonly assumed that the »intelligence revolution« which so greatly accelerated in World War II, continued to influence the evolution, possibly even the escalation, of the Cold War. New and exciting research has recently been applied to that very question: what difference did intelligence and especially intelligence organizations, make on postwar diplomacy in Europe and on the apparently inevitable emergence and finally abrupt end of the Cold War?⁴⁰ It stands to reason that quadripartitely occupied Austria from 1945 to 1955 should prove a fertile ground to start applying concrete questions

on the international and on several areas of national politics in that geopolitically sensitive part of Central Europe.⁴¹

There can be no doubt about the fact that postwar Austria quickly became one of the hot-spots of international intrigue and espionage, as corroborated by the sagacious observation of a top American diplomat who, having been stationed in Vienna and in Salzburg in the late 1940s in a private comment to a colleague in the State Department on the »fantastic intelligence saturation of Austria«, speculated in 1950 that every fourth inhabitant of the city of Salzburg was spying for one or the other domestic or foreign intelligence service.⁴² This state of affairs at a crucial juncture of the First Cold War amply reflects the fact that Austria, certainly from the era of Metternich onwards, has also had a real and pervasive tradition of state surveillance and state-organized intelligence-gathering, as it has also had its share of spectacular cases of espionage. The latter have stretched from Alfred Redl in the waning years of the Habsburg Monarchy to Felix Bloch, the Austrian-born American diplomat-turned-traitor in the late 1980s, only to mention the publicly better-known Austrian espionage cases of the last century.⁴³

How, then, can the above-mentioned considerations and methods of the study of intelligence be applied to the study of Austrian history? Adapting Wesley Wark's general research agenda for the future of intelligence studies, I recognize six major research issues for an intelligence-oriented exploration of 20th-century Austrian history.⁴⁴

1. The research issue, defined as the effort to unearth and make available, through new search strategies, bold interpretation, and occasionally through documentation, vital raw materials for intelligence-related topics and questions of Austrian history. This would clearly necessitate a concerted effort by historians and other social scientists, possibly also through organized public pressure, to achieve better access to documentary collections in state or regional Austrian archives as well as to official administrative record depositories like ministries or in the several types of security offices in this

Carol Reed's film »The Third Man« (1949) contributed to the notion of Austria as a shady place for secret and even illegal transactions. Anton Karas (1906–1985) composed the »Third Man Theme« for the film and played it on his zither. Portrait from a commemorative plaque in front of the house in the 20th district of Vienna, where Karas had spent the first 19 years of his life. The original is an autograph card from the collection of Karas' grandson Werner Chudik.

country. It is high time for Austria to lift its archival standards to liberal international norms.⁴⁵ This can only be achieved through a collective effort by all those who value transparency and accountability of all government agencies within a reasonable scope of current national interest and a reasonable span of distance in time. To be sure, there will always be major gaps in the documentation of military, security or even regular government activities, due, for example, to censorship or intentional, in some cases even legally compulsory destruction of evidence (e. g. through *Verschlusssachenverordnungen*).⁴⁶ One can, however, draw solace from the fact that in the field of intelligence as in history generally, nobody can ever get the whole story. Nor, at least, does one have to suffer from archival overload. However, a small state like Austria, surrounded as it is by small, medium-sized and great powers, will always attract foreign (intelligence) attention through diplomatic, military, political or economic channels. The evidence of such activities may, and eventually most likely will, become available in foreign archives, regrettably sometimes much earlier than in the national depositories of Austria.

2. The historical issue, focussed on intelligence in war and peace in an international but also, of course, in a national context over a longer period of time. Its case-study quality lends itself well to comparative assessment, that is, to the question of how states and governments differ in their reactions and policies to the same or at least to similar challenges. This pertains to both the civilian and military intelligence organizations and to the often naturally secretive agenda of regular national bureaucracies or organizations. It also includes the perception and psychology of governmental decision makers. Intelligence historians forcefully need to defy the notion, widely held even by their colleagues in related fields, that it is always necessary to establish a clear link be-



tween intelligence provision and policy outcome, that is, between the intelligence producer/analyst and the intelligence user. It can be just as important to illuminate the archeology of thinking or even only the mental atmosphere and specific climate under which decision makers operate and reach policy conclusions. Through the method of historical comparison one can examine the relative importance of size, power, and impact of organized intelligence in small, medium-sized, and major states, not least to determine the degree of the general applicability or lack thereof of the historical intelligence revolution in the various countries examined or compared. It is quite evident that on the national level, or one could also call it the micro level, republican Austria has not figured among the more developed and/or

active participants in the intelligence revolution; however, due to its strategic location, between the wars as embattled territory, and after World War II at a crucial borderline of the ideological divide in Europe, Austria has played a significant role on the international or macro level of the intelligence struggle between the two global super powers.

3. The public policy issue. This project has had special importance for the larger debate on the role and functions of the American intelligence community and particularly of the CIA in American foreign policy since the 1970s. This prompted a significant number of intelligence practitioners of the past and the present to engage in a fairly open debate on the past and future value of U. S. intelligence which in turn led to a much broader awareness of the complicated issues

involved. The main problems addressed in this context have been the high cost of intelligence,⁴⁷ the necessity for greater accountability to Congress and for better efficiency, the question of ethics in the use of covert operations (e. g. assassinations) and the issue of executive leadership in the whole area of intelligence.⁴⁸ One of the direct stimuli of this public discourse on intelligence in the United States has been the writing of memoirs or even defensive treatises by veterans of intelligence services which in turn have become significant sources of information also for historical analysis.⁴⁹

All of this, quite clearly, has only marginally affected the intelligence debate in Austria which historically has not gone much beyond political infighting between the governments of the day and the respective political opposition. A national community of intelligence scientists simply does not (yet) exist in Austria where intelligence issues, if they are addressed at all, are researched and analyzed only by individual representatives of academic fields such as International Law, Penal Law, Political Science and History, general and military. The small community of intelligence scholars from these various fields would have great difficulty to find or locate an organized community of practitioners with whom to enter into a dialogue.⁵⁰ Presumably only the Austrian military (*Bundesheer*), organized in the *Landesverteidigungsakademie* (LAVAK), possesses such a group of specialists but this author has not encountered any evidence that this group of active or even retired military intelligence experts has ever sought to engage in a broader national debate on general intelligence issues in Austria.⁵¹ Nor do the parliamentary security spokesmen of the political parties seem to seek the company or advice of scholarly experts on intelligence. This field has simply not yet been integrated into the Austrian political landscape.⁵²

4. The civil liberties issue. In Austria this is closely tied to the topic just discussed. It is the predominant theme in the limited public security debate in Austria. It naturally focusses on the abuse of the law primarily in the domestic behavior of both special security forces, on the one hand, the *Staatspolizeilicher Dienst* (Stapo), since 2002 the *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz und Terrorismusbekämpfung*, and on the other, the military counter intelligence service, the *Heeresabwehramt* (AbWA). Protection of privacy has been one of the issues within the limited national intelligence discourse in Austria. This debate, though obviously of great importance in any developed democracy, has obscured

the relevance of the legitimate functions of the defensive and foreign intelligence agencies necessary for the protection against interior subversion and terrorism or aggressive espionage applied from the outside, political or military.⁵³ It has also clouded the issue of the division of labor between the separate organizations for domestic and foreign intelligence. It will be up to the Austrian scholars in the various fields concerned to break down these artificial barriers and to study and debate the system of Austrian intelligence gathering and operating as a whole, both historically and as it pertains to the current needs and situation of present-day Austria. Intelligence needs for the future should also feature within the horizons of policy function and policy change.⁵⁴

5. The investigative journalism issue. Journalists of every persuasion in Austria have taken up intelligence topics much earlier, and even more comprehensively, than most intelligence scholars.⁵⁵ These journalists appear to have been motivated in their pursuit of intelligence stories more often by the wide interest of average readers in secretive politics, subversion and terrorism rather than thorough research into complicated patterns of clandestine behavior in Austria, past and present. Most of the published monographic work by journalists or amateur-historians on Austrian intelligence involvement, both historical and current, has actually proved very successful from a commercial point of view. Such books have generally sold well and have allegedly reached best-seller status, even if only for short periods of time.⁵⁶ Most of these journalistic investigations or presentations share an open or occasionally hidden tendency towards conspiracy theories; they often either stress what intelligence services or practitioners do/did wrong or they tend to exaggerate the danger of intelligence services or agents in a particular historical or current situation. Intelligence agencies are thus usually portrayed as ineffectual and bungling or they are seen as too powerful and even conspiratorial. Nevertheless, some of these journalistic products can actually prove to be a good read; however, on closer inspection, they often come out closer to fictional writing. Nevertheless, as serious analysts of intelligence have recognized, some of their quickly-arrrived-at conspiracy theories have occasionally later been proved partially accurate.⁵⁷

6. Finally, the popular culture issue. The inclusion of popular culture in the treatment of intelligence generally and of intelligence involvement of a specific country or people may prove to be a suitable vehicle for

reaching a larger audience when national or international issues of intelligence need to be addressed for reasons of popular political support. Spy novels and spy films have been perennial and almost assured successes in most societies; here again one can see that Austria is no exception.⁵⁸ Popular notions of espionage and clandestinity, if studied and understood by scholars and trade practitioners, may well serve as a widely available background against which a deeper understanding of the need for a responsible national intelligence effort can be explained, that is, verified or falsified in view of existing popular beliefs. It will take knowledgeable, responsible and skillful specialists to convey this type of message if ever the issue of the likelihood or the renunciation of significant intelligence failures of the Austrian government will arise as a general political question or principle.⁵⁹

All these issues confirm that the agenda for intelligence scholars from all disciplines in Austria, and I would argue, by analogy in most (Central) European countries, is stacked with challenges of many and certainly fundamental kinds. I am convinced that historians of Austrian intelligence or of the forces of intelligence active in Austrian history have a mammoth and special task to tackle. Judging by international experience and example, it will most likely be up to the historians to unite the scholars from the various academic fields and the retired or active practitioners in intelligence institutions to join in a national, better still, a supra-national, i. e. (Central) European community of intelligence scholars and studies.⁶⁰

The State of Intelligence Studies in Austria

It can perhaps be claimed, that there has been a substantial start towards the gradual integration of intelligence issues into the larger context of Austrian history and politics in the 20th century.⁶¹ A major step has been taken with the founding of the Austrian Center for Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies (ACIPSS) in 2004 at the University of Graz which has made it its goal to provide both the historically interested general public and the scientific community not only with information on intelligence issues (particularly with the weekly digital newsletter and two annual issues of its journal) but also offers open workshops once a semester. ACIPSS has also become a widely used reference point for Austrian and international media as well as security-related organizations.⁶² There are now over a dozen trained Austrian historians who have

taken up the challenge of tackling issues in which intelligence factors play a central role and there are also several academics in non-historical fields who have ventured into questions of historical or current importance in the areas of state surveillance, foreign intelligence-gathering, military counter-espionage or general Austrian involvement in the larger, international intelligence community. These scholars can easily be enumerated. Among historians they are, by alphabetical listing: Thomas Albrich, Dieter Bacher, Siegfried Beer, Walter Blasi, Edda Engelke, Michael Gehler, Andreas Gémes, Gerhard Jagschitz, Stefan Karner, Harald Knoll, Mario Muigg, Albert Pethö, Peter Pirker, Oliver Rathkolb, Hans Schafranek, Felix Schneider and Gerald Steinacher.⁶³ Their work is characterized largely by efforts to ground these studies in archival sources wherever and whenever available.⁶⁴ Fortunately, there are also several non-Austrian historians who have made significant contributions to the field of Austrian intelligence history, among them, again in alphabetical listing: Ralph W. Brown III, James T. Carafano, Hans Rudolf Fuhrer, Barry McLoughlin, Timothy J. Naftali, Kevin C. Ruffner and D. C. Watt.⁶⁵

Relevant contributions by former practitioners of the trade on Austrian soil, both foreign and domestic, have been made by Tennant H. Bagley, Blake Baker, Peer de Silva, Wilhelm Höttl, William Hood, Erwin Kemper, James V. Milano and Michael Sika.⁶⁶ There are a few Austrian specialists in related social and military sciences that have furthered our understanding of secretive and defensive security issues in Austrian society, past and present, foremost among them political scientists and juridical experts. Among these the following have made significant contributions: Wolfgang Braumandl, Benjamin and Ulrike Davy, Walter Feichtinger, Bernd-Christian Funk, Robert Fuchs, Gustav E. Gustenau, Walter Hauptmann, Friedrich Korkisch, Thomas Pankrat, Markus Purkart, Erich Reiter, Angelika Schätz, Helmut Widder and Hans G. Zeiger.⁶⁷ The relative dearth of non-historical specialists is the more surprising and regrettable as the question of the role and legitimacy of the current intelligence organizations in Austria has surfaced again and again over the last few years as successive governments have tried to find a political consensus on modernizing the three services: the *Staatspolizeilicher Dienst* (Stapo), since 2002 reformed into the *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz und Terrorismusbekämpfung* (BVT), and the two military intelligence institu-

tions, the *Herresnachrichtenamt* (HNaA) for foreign military intelligence and the *Abwehramt* (*AbwA*) as military security service.⁶⁸

Even though there are several significant differences in attitude and approach between the civilian security force Stapo, now BVT (which includes units for special police operations and the fight against terrorism and organized crime) and the two military intelligence organizations, they have all three elected to remain largely inconspicuous or even hidden from the view of the average citizen. There has never been an effective public attempt at self-portrayal except for an annual state security report by the Ministry of the Interior, primarily on the work of the Stapo.⁶⁹ The traditional self-imposition of silence and secrecy has resulted in a chronically skeptical and often very critical press coverage whenever intelligence-related stories or issues surface. This could only be counteracted by the active participation of these services in a public debate on the nature of the national intelligence and security needs for the present and the future of Austria.⁷⁰

What then is the status of intelligence studies in the larger context of Central Europe in the year 2010? It is indeed very difficult from an Austrian location and vantage point to accurately assess this in the territories of the former Eastern Bloc countries. This difficulty may partly be caused by the traditional difficulties with Slavic languages but there is also evidence to assume that genuine intelligence studies have not yet emerged in most of the new democracies like Hungary, Slovakia or the Czech Republic. Slovenia, Croatia, Poland and Romania appear to have started to tackle at least some of the major historical issues directly related to their former national intelligence institutions.⁷¹ In Germany, Switzerland and Italy intelligence studies are undertaken by individual scholars who can sometimes be loosely grouped in schools (e. g. the Tübingen/Cologne school of intelligence studies) or, as in the case of Germany as a whole, seen in the larger context of an active national intelligence association.⁷²

Clearly Austria and most of the Central European states can not yet strive for a comparable status in regard to intelligence power or intelligence studies with countries like the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany or Canada, but they should be in a class, for example, with Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands or even Italy. At the least, these »intelligently advanced« states could serve as models on how to proceed and where to prioritize, both in the research and practise of intelligence.

Conclusions

Even though the study of intelligence as a whole and of intelligence institutions in particular has progressed quite impressively over the last three decades, particularly in North America and in Western and Northern Europe, there still abounds a widespread ignorance of the significant impact of the role, functions and tasks to which intelligence institutions in practically every country of the world have been put for decades and are now being put on a daily basis. While the shock of 9/11 has greatly increased the need for awareness of intelligence issues, even on the part of the average citizen, there is a particular need to improve the understanding of the structures and activities of the secret intelligence institutions that practically each and every country has created.⁷³ The international system unfolding in the 21st century is likely to be volatile and to include both nation-states and transnational actors. A high premium will therefore have to be placed on intelligence activities. And public scrutiny of them will undoubtedly increase.

Intelligence institutions certainly need to be viewed and understood as products of the society in which they operate. They also need to be seen in potential partnership with the citizen as »intelligence minuteman«, a citizenry as a kind of intelligence volunteer, alert to suspicious behavior as self-defence and protection against threats to individual and public security.⁷⁴ As intelligence institutions are organized and run by national governments, intelligence history must perhaps foremost be the realm of intelligence historians of each country in question.⁷⁵ The problem is, in many countries such intelligence scientists do not exist, at least not in sufficient numbers.⁷⁶ Though it may be argued that it is more important to understand the work of present intelligence agencies and their perceived tendencies towards an almost total monitoring of citizens (e. g. through operations like the US-controlled world-wide surveillance system ECHELON), their changing roles and responsibilities cannot be understood without a proper concern for intelligence traditions, mentality and culture. This can only be studied and interpreted in historical reference. Learning lessons from history presupposes the existence of meaningful case studies and a proper sense of the past. It is the responsibility of national and international intelligence historians to provide this link from past to the present and even to the future.⁷⁷

Notes

1. In analogy to Stanley Kubrick's film classic *Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb* (Columbia Pictures 1963) and in reference to Wesley K. Wark, *Learning to Live with Intelligence, Intelligence and National Security* 18/4 (2003), 1–14.
2. Richard J. Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand. Britain, America, and Cold War Secret Intelligence*, London 2001.
3. Cf. James Der Derian, *Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed and War*, Oxford 1992.
4. Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, Princeton NJ, 1949, 3.
5. Cf. Jeffrey T. Richelson, *Foreign Intelligence Organizations*, Cambridge MA 1988; Philip H. J. Davies, *MI6 and the Machinery of Spying*, London 2004.
6. In the wake of 9/11 a spate of reliable, popular-scientific literature on current intelligence has appeared, e. g. Paul Todd, *Jonathan Bloch, Global Intelligence: The World's Secret Services Today*, London 2003.
7. This famous dictum of the Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office in 1938 in: *The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan 1938–1945*, ed. David Dilks, London 1971, 21 also became the title of a path-breaking volume: Christopher Andrew/David Dilks (eds.), *The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century*, London 1984.
8. Cf. Richard W. Rowan, *Secret Service: Thirty-three Centuries of Espionage*, New York 1937 (rev. ed. 1969), 1.
9. Cf. *The Intelligence Revolution: A Historical Perspective*, ed. Walter T. Hitchcock, Washington DC 1991.
10. 1974/75 has been called »the year of intelligence«, as it witnessed the publication of Frederick Winterbotham's memoirs *The Ultra Secret* (1974) shortly after J. C. Masterman's *The Double Cross System* (1972) in Great Britain. In the United States two literary indictments of the CIA followed one after the other: John D. Marks/Victor Marchetti, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, New York 1974, and Philip Agee, *Inside the Company: CIA Diary*, New York 1975.
11. Cf. Dennis Showalter, *Intelligence on the Eve of Transformation. Methodology, Organisation, and Application*, in: Hitchcock, *The Intelligence Revolution* (endnote 9), 15 f.
12. Cf. Phillip Knightley, *The Second Oldest Profession. Spies and Spying in the Twentieth Century*, New York 1986 and introduction to: *The Study of Espionage: Past, Present, Future?*, ed. Wesley K. Wark, Portland OR 1994, 1–13. Military intelligence organizations in the United States and in Great Britain were founded in the 1880s: the U. S. Office of Naval Intelligence in 1882 and the American Military Intelligence Division in 1885; in 1887 England followed with the establishment of the Naval Intelligence Department and the Royal Army's Intelligence Department.
13. Anti-espionage legislation was passed first in France in 1886, then in England and Italy in 1889, in Russia in 1892, in Germany in 1893, in Great Britain again in 1911 and in the United States in 1917. The first major non-military intelligence agencies came into being in Great Britain in 1909 as fore-runner of the still existing SIS/MI6 and MI5. Germany followed in 1913, Russia in 1917, France in 1935 and the United States only in 1941. Cf. Christopher Andrew, *Governments and Secret Services: A Historical Perspective*, *International Journal* 34 (1979), 167–186.
14. Cf. David Stafford, *The Silent Game: The Real World of Imaginary Spies*, Athens GA 1988.
15. Michael Herman, *Intelligence Services in the Information Age. Theory and Practice*, London 2001, 33.
16. Cf. D. C. Watt, *British Intelligence and the Coming of the Second World War in Europe*, in: *Knowing One's Enemies. Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars*, ed. Ernest R. May, Princeton NJ 1984, 237–270; Christopher Andrew, *Her Majesty's Secret Service. The Making of the British Intelligence Community*, London 1985; Wesley K. Wark, *The Ultimate Enemy. British Intelligence and Nazi Germany 1933–1939*, London 1985; David Stafford, *Camp X: Canada's School for Secret Agents 1941–1945*, Toronto 1986; John Prados, *Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations since World War II*, New York 1986; Robin W. Winks, *Cloak & Gown. Scholars in the Secret War, 1939–1961*, New York 1987; David Kahn, *The Codebreakers. The Story of Secret Writing*, New York 1967 (rev. ed. 1996); Bradley F. Smith, *Sharing Secrets with Stalin. How the Allies Traded Intelligence 1941–1945*, Lawrence KS 1996; Timothy Naftali, *Blind Spot. The Secret History of American Counterterrorism*, New York 2005; Keith Jeffery, *MI6. The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, 1919–1949*, London 2010.
17. Cf. Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Relations*, Princeton NJ 1976; Michael I. Handel, *Leaders and Intelligence, Intelligence and National Security* 3, July 1988, 3–39; Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, Cambridge 1996; Loch K. Johnson, *Secret Agencies. U.S. Intelligence in a Hostile World*, New Haven CT 1996; Arthur S. Hulnick, *Fixing the Spy Machine. Preparing American Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century*, Westport CT 1999; Richard K. Betts, *Enemies of Intelligence. Knowledge and Power in American National Security*, New York 2007; Gregory F. Treverton, *Intelligence for an Age of Terror*, New York 2009.
18. Russel J. Bowen, an American intelligence expert, bibliographer and collector of literature has expressed his conviction that the best combination of characteristics for intelligence writing would be »an academic historian with professional intelligence experience who can write like a journalist.« Russel J. Bowen, *Some Thoughts on the Quality of Intelligence Literature*, *Surveillant*, March 15, 1992, 3. Such characteristics have certainly been exhibited in the team writing of Peter Deriabin/T. H. Bagley, *KGB. Masters of the Soviet Union*, New York 1990; Christopher Andrew/Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB. The Inside Story*, London 1990; John Costello/Oleg Tsarev, *Deadly Illusions*, New York 1993; Aleksandr Fursenko/Timothy Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964*, New York 1997; and David E. Murphy/Sergei A. Kondrashev/George Bailey, *Battleground Berlin. CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War*, New Haven CT 1997.
19. Hayden B. Peake, *The Reader's Guide to Intelligence Periodicals*, Washington DC 1992.
20. Wilfred D. Koplowitz, *Teaching Intelligence* (1980); Marjorie W. Cline, *Teaching Intelligence in the Mid-1980s* (1985) and Judith M. Fontaine, *Teaching Intelligence in the 1990s. A Survey of College and University Courses on the Subject of Intelligence* (1992). Courses in intelligence history have regularly been offered at Graz University since the early 1990s.
21. Cf. Meredith Hindley, *Teaching Intelligence Project, Intelligence and National Security* 15/1, (2000), 191–218.
22. Such curricula have been developed, e. g., by Brunel University or by the University of Wales at Aberystwyth, where a master's program is offered in »intelligence and strategic security studies«.
23. The German Association, founded in 1993, has stressed its international focus by giving itself the designation »International Intelligence History Association« (IIHA) and established its own journal in 2001.
24. Four outstanding contributions, representing the three decades of the scholarly intelligence revolution must suffice here as examples: William R. Corson, *The Armies of Ignorance. The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire*, New York 1977; *Intelligence and International Relations 1900–1945*, ed. Christopher Andrew, Jeremy Noakes, Exeter 1987; Jeffrey T. Richelson, *A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century*, New York 1995, and Wolfgang Krieger, *Geschichte der Geheimdienste: Von den Pharaonen bis zur CIA*, Munich 2009.
25. The historian Walter Laqueur has pointed out that like the term »history« the word »intelligence« has more than one meaning. »On the one hand, it refers to an organization collecting information, and on the other to the information that has been gathered.« Walter Laqueur, *A World of Secrets. The Uses and Limits of Intelligence*, New York 1985, 12.
26. See Thomas F. Troy, *The »Correct« Definition of Intelligence*, *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 5/4 (1992), 433–451, and Constantine Fitzgibbon, *Secret Intelligence in the Twentieth Century*, New York 1977, 56.
27. This issue was addressed by Michael Warner, *Wanted: A Definition of »Intelligence«*, *Studies in Intelligence* 46/3 (2002), 15–22.
28. William H. Webster as quoted in a Journal of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirees Association (CIRA) of 1990. Cf. Troy, »Correct« Definition (endnote 26), 452.
29. G. J. A. O'Toole, *The Encyclopedia of American Intelligence and Espionage: From the Revolutionary War to the Present*, New York 1988, 239.
30. Walther Nicolai, *The German Secret Service*, London 1924, 53. The American intelligence theorist Shulsky believes that »it is secrecy which provides an essential key for understanding what intelligence is, and what it is not.« See Abram Shulsky,

- What is Intelligence?* (Working Group on Intelligence Reform Papers), Washington DC 1993, 97. Jennifer Sims, in the same booklet, understands »covert action as policy execution, not intelligence.« Ibid., 7.
31. This definition enlarges somewhat on John M. Nomikos, *Peacemaking Intelligence and the E. U.*, *Defensor Pacis* 6 (2000), 100. I also find the following, somewhat larger definition of intelligence as a working concept quite appealing: »Intelligence is the process by which specific types of information important to national security are requested, collected, analyzed, and provided to policy makers; the products of that process; the safeguarding of these processes and this information by counterintelligence activities; and the carrying out of operations as requested by lawful authorities.« Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, Washington DC 2000, 8.
 32. Cf. Laqueur, *World of Secrets* (endnote 25), 293 f. One rare exception among prominent former practitioners seems to have been William Colby, an OSS operational veteran of World War II and the Director of Intelligence from 1973 to 1976. In an article written for an obscure publication in 1980 Colby speaks of intelligence as a »universal social science, able to bring all social science methodologies to bear, in order to produce solid scientific results.« Quoted in Shulsky, *What is Intelligence?* (endnote 30), 21.
 33. Cf. Allen Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence*, New York 1963.
 34. Cf. Loch K. Johnson, Preface to a Theory of Strategic Intelligence, *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 16/4 (2003/04), 638–663.
 35. Cf. David Kahn, Toward a Theory of Intelligence, *Quarterly Journal of Military History* 7/2 (1995), 92–97.
 36. Cf. David Kahn, A Historical Theory of Intelligence, *Intelligence and National Security* 16/3 (2001), 79–92. For another inspiring and original attempt to contribute to existing theory about intelligence and intelligence institutions cf. Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, Cambridge 1996.
 37. In an interesting chat between former rival intelligence agents of the CIA and KGB, who were both stationed in Vienna during the mid-1950s, there was total agreement between these two veteran intelligence officers, »dass wir im Kalten Krieg durch unsere Arbeit größere Feindseligkeiten verhindert haben. [...] Unser großes Verdienst als Nachrichtendienst im Kalten Krieg war, sehr tief in die Geheimnisse der anderen Seite eindringen zu sein.« John Mapother/Sergej Kondraschow, *Spione unter sich. Ein Plausch über den Kalten Krieg*, *Kursbuch* 124, Juni 1996, 185–204.
 38. Kahn, *An Historical Theory* (endnote 36), 89 f.; Jennifer E. Sims, *Understanding Friends and Enemies. The Context for American Intelligence Reform*, in: *Transforming U.S. Intelligence*, ed. Jennifer E. Sims, Burton Gerber, Washington DC 2005, 17.
 39. Cf. Michael Fry/Miles Hochstein, *Epistemic Communities: Intelligence Studies and International Relations*, in: Wark (ed.), *Espionage* (endnote 12), 14–28; James der Derian, *Anti-Diplomacy, Intelligence Theory, and Surveillance Practice*, in: *ibid.*, 32 f.
 40. Cf. John Lewis Gaddis, *Intelligence, Espionage, and Cold War Origins*, *Diplomatic History* 13 (1989), 193; D. C. Watt, *Intelligence and the Historian: A Comment on John Gaddis's »Intelligence, Espionage, and Cold War Origins«*, *Diplomatic History* 14 (1990), 199–204; Michael Herman/J. Kenneth McDonald, *Did Intelligence Matter in the Cold War?*, Oslo 2006.
 41. It certainly did so for American intelligence. Cf. Siegfried Beer, *Rund um den »Dritten Mann«: Amerikanische Geheimdienste in Österreich 1945–1955*, in: *Österreich im Frühen Kalten Krieg 1945–1958. Spione, Partisanen, Kriegspläne*, ed. Erwin A. Schmidl, Wien/Köln/Weimar 2000, 73–99.
 42. Secret and personal letter from Coburn Kidd to Francis Williams, October 7, 1950. National Archives, Record Group 43, Lot M-88, Box 7. Cited by Günter Bischof in: *Contemporary Austrian Studies* 5 (1997), 12. This particular issue also provided a ground-breaking forum entitled »Toward a History of Austrian Intelligence Studies«, 203–292.
 43. There are several other cases which for different reasons have not become widely known, among them: Theodor Maly, Arnold Deutsch, Hede Massing, Peter Smolka-Smollett and Gustav Hochenbichler.
 44. See Wark, *Study of Espionage* (endnote 12), 2–8.
 45. Though modest attempts have been made in this direction through the introduction of a national Archives Law (*Bundesarchivgesetz*), effective since January 1, 2000, this initiative falls far short from securing sensitive information for future historical research. Cf. *Die Presse*, March 27, 2009, 3.
 46. It has become evident that even though substantial Cold War secret archives have already been released, much remains closed and will probably fall victim to organized destruction, not only in Austria. Cf. Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand* (endnote 2), 7 f., and *Die Presse*, December 14, 2009, 3: »Österreichische Archive: Da gibt es fast schon sowjetische Zustände.«
 47. For the first time ever officially released by the then Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, as amounting to almost 30 billion dollars for the fiscal year 1998. Cf. *International Herald Tribune*, December 5–6, 1998.
 48. One of the more systematic and serious attacks on the American intelligence establishment was launched by an influential U. S. senator and former university professor: Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Secrecy. The American Experience*, New Haven CT 1998.
 49. Good cases in point are several autobiographically-based studies by former CIA directors: William E. Colby, *Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA*, New York 1978; Stanfield Turner, *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition*, Boston 1985; Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five American Presidents and How They Won the Cold War*, New York 1996; Richard Helms (with William Hood), *A Look Over My Shoulder. A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency*, New York 2003; George J. Tenet, *At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA*, New York 2007.
 50. There have been a couple of former practitioners in Austrian security agencies who have sought a broader audience for Austrian intelligence issues: Erwin Kemper, *Verrat an Österreich*, Wien 1996; Michael Sika, *Mein Protokoll. Innenansichten einer Republik*, St. Pölten 2000.
 51. For a long time it has been the monopoly of pacifist or anti-militarist organizations and publications in this country to try to stimulate public debate on such issues. One example would be the little-known Viennese journal ZOOM, later called CONTEXT which regularly addressed itself to intelligence and security questions relevant for Austrian history or current Austrian politics. Cf. ZOOM 4–5, 1996, on Gladio and 4, 1998, on the parliamentary control of intelligence organizations in Austria.
 52. First steps in the right direction were taken by the head of the Austrian foreign military intelligence (*Heeres-Nachrichtendienst*) who for the first time went public with an analysis of the security and intelligence repercussions, and not only for Austria, of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Cf. Alfred Schätz, *Der transnationale Terrorismus nach dem 11. September. Sicherheitspolitische und nachrichtendienstliche Konsequenzen*, *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift* 40/3 (2002), 279–288. Another novelty of this kind was the co-authored article by the two first chiefs of the BVT: Gert Rene Polli/Peter Gridling, 11. September 2001 und seine Auswirkungen auf die Terrorismusbekämpfung. Aus der Perspektive der Staatspolizei und des Staatsschutzes, *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift* 40/4 (2002), 405–414. More recently two chiefs of Austrian intelligence organizations have talked to journalists: cf. *News*, October 28, 2010, 34 f. and *Die Presse am Sonntag*, November 28, 2010, 9.
 53. Cf. *Die Presse*, December 27, 1999, 3: »Wien als ein Tummelplatz der Agenten – Mythos und Wirklichkeit.«
 54. Such a debate could have been fruitful in the context of the establishment of an Austrian National Security Council which should have led to the installation of some kind of national intelligence coordinator at the executive level, directly responsible to the federal chancellor.
 55. Laudable exceptions are juridical studies by Ulrike Davy, *Die Geheime Staatspolizei in Österreich*, Wien 1990, or a collective analysis: *Alpen-Stasi. Die II. Republik im Zerrspiegel der Staatspolizei*, ed. Hans G. Zeger et al., Linz 1990.
 56. Cf. Harald Irnberger, *Nelkenstrausz ruft Praterstern. Am Beispiel Österreich: Funktion und Arbeitsweise geheimer Nachrichtendienste in einem neutralen Land*, Wien 1983; Hans Wolker, *Schatten über Österreich. Das Bundesheer und seine geheimen Dienste*, Wien 1993; Manfred Fuchs, *Der österreichische Geheimdienst. Das zweitälteste Gewerbe der Welt*, Wien 1994; Kid Möchel, *Der geheime Krieg der*

- Agenten. Spionagedrehscheibe Wien*, Hamburg 1997 and, though only partially centered on Austrian affairs: Martin Haidinger, Reinhold Knoll, *Spione, Spitzel und Agenten. Analyse einer Schattenwelt*, St. Pölten 2001.
57. An argument, convincingly presented by Christopher Hitchens in the chapter »The Bond of Intelligence« in his book: *Blood, Class, and Nostalgia*, London 1990, 319–339.
 58. The internationally popular notion of Austria as a shady place for secret and even illegal transactions can effectively be transported even by movies. The Anglo-American co-production of *The Third Man* (1949) is a rather convincing case in point. Cf. Siegfried Beer, »The Third Man« and British Intelligence, *History Today* 51/5 (2001), 45–51.
 59. Cf. Siegfried Beer, Is Austrian Intelligence Finally Coming Out of the Closet?, *Journal for Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies* 4/2 (2010), 5 f.
 60. In reference to regional concerns I am using the term Central Europe in a politically neutral and mostly geographic sense and thereby mean to talk of the Danubian, Alpine and Adriatic States in the centre of Europe as they have consistently interacted, not least through their common and mutually influential past within the Habsburg Empire, particularly – though not exclusively – in the 19th century. Therefore the following states as existent at the beginning of the 21st century are included: Austria, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Italy, Switzerland, Germany, The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Romania.
 61. For a previous attempt to characterize the state of intelligence studies in Austria see Siegfried Beer, Intelligence Studies: The Case of Austria, in: *A Flourishing Craft: Teaching Intelligence Studies*, ed. Russell G. Swenson, Washington DC 1999, 143–153.
 62. Cf. its home page (www.acipss.org) under the category Medienspiegel or the booklet *Austria's Secret and Intelligence Services*, ed. SIAK, Wien 2008.
 63. The following are quite randomly selected examples of their work: Thomas Albrich, *Exodus durch Österreich. Die jüdischen Flüchtlinge 1945–1948*, Innsbruck 1987; Edda Engelke, Zum Thema Spionage gegen die Sowjetunion, in: *Österreich im Frühen Kalten Krieg* (endnote 41), 119–135; *Verspielte Selbstbestimmung? Die Südtirolfrage 1945/46 in US-Geheimdienstberichten und österreichischen Akten. Eine Dokumentation*, ed. Michael Gehler, Innsbruck 1996; *Geheime Akten des KGB. »Margarita Ottlinger«*, ed. Stefan Karner, Graz 1992; Albert Pethö, *Agenten für den Doppeladler. Österreichs Geheimer Dienst im Weltkrieg*, Graz 1998; *Gesellschaft und Politik am Beginn der Zweiten Republik. Vertrauliche Berichte der US-Militäradministration aus Österreich 1945, in englischer Originalfassung*, ed. Oliver Rathkolb, Wien 1985; Hans Schafranek, Im Hinterland des Feindes: Sowjetische Fallschirmagenten im Deutschen Reich 1941–1944, *DÖW Jahrbuch* 1996, S. 10–40; Gerald Steinacher, *Südtirol und die Geheimdienste*, Innsbruck 2000.
 64. Cf. Siegfried Beer, Der Kampf der Geheimdienste. Anglo-amerikanische Quellen zum »Ersten« Kalten Krieg in Österreich (1945–1953), in: *Kalter Krieg. Beiträge zur Ost-West-Konfrontation 1945 bis 1990*, ed. Stefan Karner, Erich Reiter, Gerald Schöpfer, Graz 2002, 183–198.
 65. Examples of their work are: Ralph W. Brown III, U.S. Army Intelligence in Vienna, *Journal for Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies* 1/1 (2007), 35–45; James T. Carafano, Waltzing into the Cold War. US Army Intelligence for Post-war Austria, 1944–1948, *Contemporary Austrian Studies* 7 (1999), 165–189; Hans Rudolf Fuhrer, Die Schweiz und Österreich im Fadenkreuz des militärischen Nachrichtendienstes der DDR, *Jahrbuch für internationale Sicherheitspolitik* (1999), 497–524; Barry McLoughlin, Proletarian Cadres en route: Austrian NKVD Agents in Britain 1941–1943, *Labour History Review* 62/3 (1997), 296–317; Timothy J. Naftali, Creating the Myth of the Alpenfestung: Allied Intelligence and the Collapse of the Nazi-State, *Contemporary Austrian Studies* 5 (1997), 203–246; Kevin C. Ruffner, Wilhelm Höttl. International Man of Mystery, *Center for the Study of Intelligence Bulletin*, Nr. 12, Fall 2001, 4–9; D. C. Watt, Austria as a Special Case in Cold War Europe. A Personal Note, in: *Österreich unter alliierter Besatzung 1945–1955*, ed. Alfred Ableitinger, Siegfried Beer, Eduard G. Staudinger, Vienna 1998, 269–297; *Krieg im Äther. Widerstand und Spionage im Zweiten Weltkrieg*, ed. Hans Schafranek, Vienna 2004.
 66. Among these biographical contributions the following are selected examples: Peter Derabin, Tennant H. Bagley, Fedorchuk, the KGB, and the Soviet Succession, in: *Orbis. A Journal of World Affairs* 26 (1982), 611–635; Blake Baker, Erinnerungen eines Feldwebels der britischen Feldsicherheit (FSS) in Österreich, in: *Österreich unter alliierter Besatzung* (endnote 65), 559–577; Peer de Silva, *Sub Rosa: The CIA and the Uses of Intelligence*, New York 1978; William Hood, *Mole: The True Story of the First Russian Intelligence Officer Recruited by the CIA*, New York 1982; James V. Milano, *Soldiers, Spies and the Ratline. America's Undeclared War against the Soviets*, Washington DC 1996.
 67. Examples of their work are: Benjamin and Ulrike Davy, *Gezümmte Polizeigewalt? Aufgaben und Neuordnung der Sicherheitspolizei in Österreich*, Wien 1991; Robert Fuchs, *Das österreichische Militärbefugnisgesetz. Ein Systemvergleich mit dem schweizerischen und ungarischen Recht*, Rechtswiss. Diplomarbeit, Graz 2001; Markus Purkart, *Staatspolizei, Heeresnachrichtendienst und Abwehrendienst. Die österreichischen Geheimdienste aus der Perspektive parlamentarischer Transparenz und Kontrolle. Eine politikwissenschaftliche Analyse zur österreichischen Demokratie, Sozialwiss. Diplomarbeit*, Vienna 1998; Angelika Schätz, *Nachrichtendienste in der österreichischen Rechtsentwicklung, unter Berücksichtigung des internationalen Rahmens*, Rechtswiss. Diss., Vienna 1999; Helmut Widder, Die parlamentarische Kontrolle von Staatspolizei und militärischen Nachrichtendiensten in Österreich, in: *Für Staat und Recht. Festschrift für Herbert Schambeck*, ed. Johannes Hengstschläger et al., Berlin 1994, 647–661.
 68. Cf. Siegfried Beer, »Bound« to Cooperate. Austria's Little-known Intelligence Community since 1945, *Journal of Intelligence History* 3 (2003), 19–31. During the 1990s the powers of surveillance and control for the three Austrian services have been enlarged significantly by amendments to relevant legislation, the *Militärbefugnisgesetz* and to the *Polizeiarbeitsgesetz*.
 69. The first of these *Staatsschutzberichte* was published in 1997.
 70. Great Britain would be a good model for this as in 1993 the British government decided to go public about its intelligence institutions and to explain their tasks and functions to the electorate in a 27-page pamphlet, entitled: Central Intelligence Machinery.
 71. In Croatia, for example, an intelligence journal was started in 2000, edited by Janos Matus and Miroslav Tadjman, entitled National Security and the Future.
 72. Cf. as representative examples Christof Mauch, *Schattenkrieg gegen Hitler. Das Dritte Reich im Visier der amerikanischen Geheimdienste, 1941 bis 1945*, Stuttgart 1999; *Geheimdienste in der Weltgeschichte. Spionage und verdeckte Aktionen von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart*, ed. Wolfgang Krieger, München 2003; Reinhard R. Doerries, *Hitler's Intelligence Chief: Walter Schellenberg*, New York 2009.
 73. While the 20th century can also be understood as the age of secret intelligence, the 21st century may become the age of public intelligence as states and governments might recognize the need to go public with their intelligence insights in order to promote public support for their concrete policies in war and peace. The recent intelligence revelations by WikiLeaks have certainly reinforced that tendency.
 74. Alessandro Politi, The Citizen as »Intelligence Minuteman«, *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 16/1 (2003), 34–38.
 75. Needless to stress, comparative studies can be particularly enlightening. Cf. *British and American Approaches to Intelligence*, ed. Kenneth G. Robertson, London 1987.
 76. Not even in such powerful countries as Germany. Cf. Wolfgang Krieger, German Intelligence History: A field in search of scholars, in: *Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century. Journeys in Shadows*, ed. L. V. Scott, Peter Jackson, London 2004, 42–53.
 77. Cf. the books by the founder of Strategic Forecasting, Inc., George Friedman: *America's Secret War. Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between America and its Enemies*, New York 2004, and *The Next 100 Years. A Forecast for the 21st Century*, New York 2009.

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